Money and debt in the structure of payments by Edward J. Green
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review
Spring 1999, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 13–29




Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Abstract
In Scott Freeman’s (1996) model, payment system arrangements based on inter-
mediated debt that is settled with money achieve higher welfare than does direct
money payment. In a simpliﬁed version of Freeman’s model, welfare can be
further improved and efficiency achieved by a monetary authority participating
in a secondary market for debt or by a private intermediary using a common
clearinghouse device. The analysis clariﬁes that ordinary private agents can
assume the role of central bank or clearinghouse; no artiﬁcial agent, posited
solely to play that role and endowed with special capabilities for it, is necessary.
The institutional features required for a central bank or a clearinghouse to
achieve efficiency, particularly features related to central bank independence,
are discussed informally.
This article is reprinted from Monetary and Economic Studies (May 1997,
vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 63–87) with the permission of the Institute for Monetary and
Economic Studies of the Bank of Japan.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.An aphorism in economics is that money exchanges for
goods, and goods for money, but goods do not exchange
for goods. However, if one interprets money to mean
base money or other outside money (such as balances
held at a central bank), then the aphorism’s simple pat-
tern of money-for-goods exchange hardly captures the
structure of actual transactions. The goals of this study
are to understand the structure of transactions more close-
ly and to address two major issues regarding it.
Notwithstanding the dissimilarities among various
payment arrangements at a ﬁne-grained level, most such
arrangements have two main structural features in com-
mon. First, with few exceptions (such as cashiers checks
and some wire-transfer networks based on real-time gross
settlement), payment arrangements involve the creation
of short-term debt of the payor to the payee that is settled
through intermediaries. Second, although incurring short-
term indebtedness is a substitute for using money for the
purchase of a good, these debt-based arrangements do not
wholly replace money, because money is used to settle
the debt.
1
Speciﬁcally, then, this study concerns payment ar-
rangements based on intermediated debt that is settled
using money. Such arrangements include checks, wire-
transfer systems with netting arrangements, credit cards,
and the like. The two features emphasized here lie at the
root of current discussions regarding welfare and policy
aspects of the payment system. Regarding large-value
payments especially, there is controversy over whether or
not the creation of debt is a desirable feature of a pay-
ment system. Given that there is a feasible way to make a
cash transaction or to achieve gross settlement of an elec-
tronic transaction in real time, it is not obvious what the
gain is from making payments in a way that involves cre-
ation of debt at an interim stage. In practice, the creation
of debt carries at least a small risk of inability to settle, so
one would not choose arrangements involving netting or
other forms of debt creation if cash or gross-settlement
arrangements were equally good in other respects. To the
extent that the concentration of this debt in the possession
of an intermediary should be cause for additional con-
cern, this argument becomes even more persuasive. In
order to make a good case for payment-system arrange-
ments involving intermediated debt, therefore, some spe-
ciﬁc beneﬁt must be found. Particularly in the case of
electronic payments, where the real cost of making a
transaction is extremely small, the mere fact that netting
economizes on the number of transactions is unlikely to
be a sufficient consideration. Thus, it is important to un-
derstand whether or not there is some additional beneﬁt
from using intermediated debt as a means of payment.
The theoretical basis for such understanding is provided
by Freeman (1996a, b), who shows that such a beneﬁt
does exist in some model environments.
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The use of cash settlement for the debt created in the
payment system raises a further issue regarding the ap-
propriate role of the public sector and especially of a cen-
tral bank. Today, countries are taking various stands on
this issue. In some countries, the government is solely a
regulator of the payment system, while in others, the gov-
ernment is an active participant. In either case, there is a
subordinate issue of how to apportion the responsibility
for public-sector involvement among the treasury, the
bank supervisory agency, and the central bank; and coun-
tries differ in their approach to this as well.
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Most current discussion of these issues considers the
extent to which proﬁt-maximizing operation of the pay-
ment system might potentially interfere with the conduct
of monetary policy. There is consensus, although not una-
nimity, that this is not an urgent problem. However, there
is another relevant issue that has not been much dis-
cussed: whether participation by the monetary authority
can potentially enhance the economic efficiency of the
payment system.
4 In this study, I address this efficiency
issue in the context of Freeman’s (1996b) model.
5
Freeman shows that the potential of a central bank to
enhance payment-system efficiency can only be evaluat-
ed by close study of the economy concerned. For some
parametrizations of the model economy, a laissez-faire
market in intermediated debt is efficient. For others, re-
strictions on private agents’ market access entail that the
monetary authority can improve welfare relative to some
baseline by participating in a secondary market for debt
that has not yet been settled.
The baseline to which I refer is the payment system
that would be efficient if only a subset of the restrictions
on market access were in force. Of course, to make a
strong case for the need for the central bank to be a pay-
ment-system operator, one would have to show that its
participation can improve welfare relative to the best pay-
ment system that a purely private system could imple-
ment in precisely the economy where its participation is
being envisioned. Freeman’s (1996b) model is not for-
mulated at a sufficiently fundamental level to answer this
question in a fully convincing way, but it comes close to
doing so. I will show that efficiency requires an asset
that is a perfect substitute for currency, in a sense that I
will make precise. Following Freeman (1996a), I extend
the model economy to permit a private-sector intermedi-
ary to trade its own debt obligation for the debt issued by
the initial payor, thus providing such a perfect-substitute
asset in the model environment.
6 Since the original debt
claim is transferred from the payee to the intermediary,
this trade of debt claims is tantamount to novation and
substitution, a contractual device used by some clearing-
houses.
7 Direct participation of the monetary authority is
not essential to achieve efficiency in this model. This re-
sult can even hold in the extended version of a model
environment that Freeman (1996a, b) studies, where in-
termediaries are unable to settle some of the debt that
they issue.
Both the version of the model with central bank par-
ticipation and the version with novation and substitution
implicitly prejudge the issue of asset substitutability, since
both versions abstract from aspects of the economy such
as privacy of information and limited or costly enforce-
ability of commitments, and these aspects might or might
not give agents reason to regard a central bank as a more
(or possibly less) trustworthy institution than a private
clearinghouse. Although such issues related to credibility
and institutional governance lie beyond the scope of the
formal model, it is clear that they are inseparable from the
market equilibrium issues which are formalized in the
model. In particular, issues that determine the effective-
ness of participation by a central bank in the payment sys-tem appear closely related to those that arise with respect
to political independence of a central bank.
Modeling Strategy
To address the welfare questions discussed in the intro-
duction requires a model in which the following three
means of payment, which are observed in actual econo-
mies, emerge endogenously in an equilibrium:
1. Money is used directly as a medium of payment
for goods.
2. Some purchases of goods are also ﬁnanced by the
issuance of private debt, and money must be used
to pay these purchases off. The use of money for
settling debt is conceptually distinct from its direct
use as a medium of exchange. In the equilibrium,
one should be able to identify separate transactions
where the two types of use occur.
3. Besides there being transactions in which money is
exchanged for a good, there are also transactions in
which money is exchanged for a debt that has not
yet been settled.
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To formulate such a model, I follow the general strat-
egy that was introduced by Sargent and Wallace (1982),
who exhibit an equilibrium that has the ﬁrst two attri-
butes. The idea is to use an overlapping generations mod-
el, so that money can have value in equilibrium and its
use can be essential for efficiency, and to posit some het-
erogeneity among agents within each generational cohort
in order to provide an incentive and efficiency rationale
for other types of transaction to occur. I proceed by ﬁrst
constructing two simpler model economies, in order to
make clear how subsystems of the main model work. To
begin, I specify the population and endowment structure
that are common to all the models.
Before beginning the technical exposition, however,
let me emphasize that the overlapping generations struc-
ture of the model is a technical convenience. The aim is
to formulate the simplest possible model in which the
various kinds of transaction observed in actual economies
can all play a role and in which welfare questions regard-
ing those transactions can be framed and analyzed. The
spirit of the modeling exercise is that this model is exem-
plary of models with a lack of double coincidence of
wants and with restrictions on agents’ access to markets.
These fundamental economic features of the model are
what lead to the results; consequently, one would conﬁ-
dently expect parallel results from the analysis of more
realistic models with the same features. From this per-
spective, the speciﬁc demographic structure of the model
formulated here is a matter of convenience, although it




In each time period t = 1, 2, 3, ..., a set At = Ct È Dt of
agents is born. The populations Ct and Dt each consist of
a continuum of agents, of measure 1. I will sometimes
refer to the agents in Ct and Dt as creditors and debtors,
respectively, since the debtors will borrow from the cred-
itors in the equilibrium trading pattern of the model.
Each agent lives for two periods (t and t + 1). Further-
more, there is a set C0 of agents, the initial old (also a
continuum of measure 1), who live only in period 1.
Deﬁne C = C1 È C2 È ...a n dD = D1 È D2 È ....
Each agent in At is endowed with one unit of a per-
ishable good in period t and with nothing in period t +1 .
Agents in C and D are endowed with different goods.
Each agent in C0 is endowed with one unit of ﬁat
money, but with no consumption good.
Let x1t (respectively, x2t) be an agent’s consumption
of the endowment good of agents in C (respectively, D)
in period t.
An agent must consume a nonnegative quantity of

















u(x1t)+v(x2(t+n)) if agent i is in C
u (x1t)+v (x2t) if agent i is in D
v(x21) if agent i is in C0
.
Assume that all the functions on the right side are strictly
increasing, are strictly concave, and satisfy the Inada con-
dition that the limit of the derivative as the argument
tends to zero from the right is inﬁnite.
Given this speciﬁcation of utility functions, and given
the focus on stationary allocations in this study, the fol-
lowing notation that suppresses time subscripts will be
convenient:
x1 = consumption of x1t by an agent in Ct
x¢ 2 = consumption of x2(t+1) by an agent in Ct
x
*
1 = consumption of x1t by an agent in Dt
x
*
2 = consumption of x2t by an agent in Dt.
Note that agents in D wish to trade with members of
their own age cohort in C, while agents in C wish to
trade with members of the next age cohort in D. Thus, it
will be seen that, as in the standard overlapping genera-
tions model of money (as well as in most other models
in which ﬁat money is endogenously valued in equilib-
rium), there can be no mutually advantageous trades un-
less ﬁat money has value.
Efficiency
I concentrate on stationary allocations, that is, those in
which corresponding agents in distinct age cohorts re-
ceive identical lifetime consumption bundles, except for
the dating of their goods. (The consumption of an agent
in C0 is identical to the consumption of an agent in Ct at
period t + 1.)
An efficient stationary allocation is a stationary allo-
cation that solves the problem of maximizing a weighted
sum of utilities of the members of C and D in each age




2) is efficient if, for some p >
0, it solves the problem





subject to the feasibility constraints that
(3) x1 + x
*
1 =1(4) x¢ 2 + x
*
2 =1 .
A necessary and sufficient condition for a feasible sta-
tionary allocation to be efficient is that





I study this criterion of efficiency because of its tech-
nical simplicity and because it implies the standard Pare-
to-efficiency criterion. An efficient stationary allocation
is Pareto efficient in the set of all feasible allocations of
the inﬁnite-horizon economy, as shown by Okuno and
Zilcha (1980).
I am concerned with implementing a speciﬁc alloca-
tion under various constraints on market access. To de-
ﬁne the allocation, consider a two-agent exchange econ-
omy. The ﬁrst agent is endowed with one unit of good 1
and has the utility function w(x)=u(x1)+v(x¢ 2). The sec-
ond agent is endowed with one unit of good 2 and has





2). Deﬁne the sta-









2) are the Walrasian consumption bundles of
these two agents. Note that equation (5) is a necessary
condition for a Walrasian equilibrium of the two-agent
economy, so the corresponding stationary equilibrium of
the inﬁnite-horizon economy is efficient.
Clearly, the Walrasian price that supports this equilib-
rium is
(6) ˜ p = (1/˜ x
*
1,1 / ˜ x¢ 2).
Market Access, Securities, and Equilibrium
I complete the speciﬁcation of the economy by imposing
explicit constraints on agents’ access to markets in each
period.
9 In each period, there will be a sequence of sub-
periods. In each subperiod, only a subset of the agents
currently alive will be able to trade or settle debts. In or-
der for trade or debt settlement to be transacted between
agents who do not have direct access to one another,
money or another security must be accepted by a third
agent or even by several intermediate agents.
Equilibrium is deﬁned in terms of two features: agents
are price takers who make optimal trading plans, given
prices in the markets to which they have access (includ-
ing correctly anticipated prices in markets to which they
will have future access); and markets clear.
10
For clarity, I consider three access-constraint speci-
ﬁcations below. In the next section, I specify the con-
straints in such a way that only the use of ﬁat money is
required to support an efficient equilibrium. Following
that, I specify the constraints in such a way that debt, as
well as ﬁat money, needs to be used. Finally, I specify
the constraints in such a way that the debt must be inter-
mediated in order to be settled. Also in this ﬁnal speciﬁ-
cation, either the stock of money must ﬂuctuate within
each period, or the debt must be exchanged for debt is-
sued by the intermediary (that is, novation must occur),
in order for an efficient stationary equilibrium to be sup-
ported.
Modeling Money, Debt, and Intermediation
A Basic Overlapping Generations Structure:
Valued Fiat Money
Suppose that, in each period t = 1, 2, ..., all of the agents
currently alive are able to trade among themselves in the
following pattern. First, the agents in Ct−1 trade with those
in Dt. Subsequently, the agents in Dt trade with those in
Ct.
I show that, because each agent in C0 holds a unit of
money, there is a trading pattern for goods that can
achieve efficiency in this market structure. Young D
agents give some of their endowment to old C agents
and subsequently receive some of the endowment of the
young C agents. The entire money stock is passed in the
opposite direction to goods at each stage, so that the old
C agents continue to be the money holders at the begin-
ning of each period. If prices are set appropriately, mar-
kets clear and all agents have incentive to make the effi-
cient trades.
To formalize this idea, let each period t be divided in-
to two subperiods, t.1 and t.2. Market participation is de-
scribed in Table 1, which lists the agents who have ac-
cess and the goods that are traded within each subperiod.
Money is also traded in each subperiod, and it is the nu-
meraire.
11 It will be represented as the last coordinate of
a price vector.




2,1) that has only two coordinates, since good 2 (that
is, the debtors’ endowment good) is the only good avail-






2,1), since both goods 1 and 2 are avail-
able in the market. (By the Inada condition on v*, debt-
ors will not trade away their entire endowments in t.1.)
I adopt the following notation to represent net trades.
A net trade is always represented by the variable z, which
can have the following superscripts and subscripts:
1. An asterisk superscript immediately following z in-
dicates that the net trade belongs to an agent in D.
2. A numerical superscript indicates the subperiod in
which the net trade is made.
3. A prime on the numerical superscript indicates that
the net trade is made by an agent in the second pe-
riod of life (that is, by an agent in At−1 in period t).
4. A subscript indicates a coordinate of z. A numeri-
cal subscript 1 or 2 refers to one of the two goods
available in the period of the market, and a letter
subscript m (money), d (debt issued in the current
period), d¢ (debt issued in the preceding period), or
n (debt arising from novation, which will be intro-
duced later) may also occur.
The letter p denotes a price vector. A numerical su-
perscript on p indicates the subperiod of the market to
which this price corresponds. A subscript on p, which
can take the values just deﬁned, indicates a coordinate.
An agent in Ct has access in t.2 (for t > 0) and in















¢)i n( t+1).1. Thus, the market-
constrained optimization problem of an agent in Ct is






















2 ³ 0 p
1z
1¢ £ 0.
(Note that, by the speciﬁcation of the agent’s endow-
ment and utility function, utility maximization will clear-










m. An agent in C0




¢ = −1; that is, old creditors dispose of
their entire money stock.)


















2) in these peri-












































1 ³ −1 p
2z
*2 £ 0.
The structure of trading in this environment is indi-
cated in Chart 1. Time is on the horizontal axis. An
agent’s life span is depicted by a thin horizontal line of
two periods’ length. Within each period, the subperiods
in which an agent has market access are shown by a
thickening of the line into a bar. (A thin vertical line
connects these bars during each subperiod.) The top line
(extending only through period 1) is C0. After that, there
are four generations having two lines each, representing
D¢ t and C¢ t in descending order.
Since Ct−1, Ct, and Dt all have the same number of








Now it is straightforward to verify, using equation (5),





equilibrium allocation of this market structure. Equilib-
rium is supported by the following net trades and prices:
(11) p1 = (1/˜ x¢ 2,1 )
(12) z
1¢ =− z
*1 =( ˜ x¢ 2,−1)
(13) p
2 = (1/˜ x
*
1,1 / ˜ x¢ 2,1 )
(14) z
2 =− z
*2 =( − ˜ x¢ 1,0,1).
Because the C agents closely resemble the agents in
the standard overlapping generations model, and the D
agents want only to trade their endowment good for a
contemporaneous good, it is not surprising that the effi-
cient equilibrium here bears very close resemblance to
the efficient overlapping generations equilibrium. In par-
ticular, money has value, but there is no credit, and there
is no role for a monetary authority.
Reversing the Order of Transactions
Within a Period: Debt Securities
Now consider the opposite order of transactions. That is,
suppose that ﬁrst the agents in Dt trade with those in Ct
and subsequently the agents in Ct−1 trade with those in
Dt.
For ﬁat money to be passed from the old C agents to
the young ones, it would have to pass through the hands
of the young D agents. But since those agents do not
meet the old C agents until it is too late to deal with the
young ones, that cannot happen.
If it is possible for young agents to issue debt securi-
ties that they pay in money when they are old, then there
is a solution. The young D agents can use these securi-
ties to ﬁnance their consumption of goods purchased
from young C agents, then give some of their endow-
ments to old C agents in return for their money, and ﬁ-
nally carry the money into the next period and use it to
repay the holders (who will still be alive since they are
young when the debt securities are issued). This repay-
ment of debt requires an additional subperiod in each pe-
riod, which I will assume to occur between the two sub-
periods where markets occur. Although from an ex post
perspective, repayment of debt is a mandatory transfer,
not a voluntary exchange, it will be treated formally as
an exchange. That is, after a debt is repaid, the debtor’s
portfolio holds a zero quantity of debt.
The debt security traded in this economy is a com-
mitment to pay one unit of money to the bearer, at some
time during the period following the period in which the
debt security is issued. The quantity of this security that
an agent acquires is denoted d. That is, issuing a unit of
debt corresponds to choosing d = −1.
Table 2 shows the order of transactions within each
period t. The last column shows, for each subperiod,
which goods (1 and 2) and assets (d and m) are traded.
These are listed in the order they appear in the price vec-
tor. The numeraire is last.
The market-constrained optimization problem of an






































The market-constrained optimization problem of an























































The structure of trading in this environment is indi-
cated in Chart 2.











Again, it is straightforward to verify that the Walrasian




2) is an equilibrium allo-
cation of this market structure. Equilibrium is supported
by the following prices and net trades:
(20) p
1 = (1/˜ x
*
1,1 /˜ x¢ 2,1 )
(21) z
1 =− z







3 = (1/˜ x¢ 2,1 )
(24) z
3¢ =− z
*3 =(˜ x¢ 2,−1).
The efficient equilibrium in this transaction structure
involves use of both valued ﬁat money and debt securi-
ties, but the debt securities are not intermediated, and
there is no role for a monetary authority.
Separation Within a Cohort:
Intermediated Debt Securities
Now I come to one of the two main market structures in
this study. In this structure, not all agents of the same co-
hort can communicate directly with one another in the
second period of their lives. Speciﬁcally, some debtors
are not able to repay creditors to whom they have issued
debt. Those creditors therefore need to sell their debt to
other agents with whom the debtors can communicate.
These purchasers of debt thus serve as intermediaries in
the settlement of the original transactions.
To formalize this environment, deﬁne the partitions
Ct = C¢ t È C² t and Dt = D¢ t È D² t, for each t ³ 1. Deﬁne
C² 0 = C0. For each t ³ 1, let there be gÎ(0,1) agents in
C¢ t and dÎ(0,1) agents in D¢ t.
The market structure will be speciﬁed in such a way
that creditors in C¢ t cannot be repaid in t + 1 by debtors
in D² t. To make this speciﬁcation, consider the following
sequence of trading-opportunity subperiods within each
period t > 1. (Only the ﬁrst and last subperiods occur for
t = 1.)
1. All agents in At trade with one another.
2. All agents in Ct−1 enter the market. Agents in D¢ t−1
also enter the market and have the opportunity to
pay the debt securities to their creditors.
3. All agents in Ct−1 can trade money for outstanding
debt securities that have not been settled. For now,
assume that no new debt can be issued in this sub-
period.
4. Agents in C¢ t−1 trade with agents in Dt and then
leave the market.
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5. Agents in D² t−1 enter and have the opportunity to
pay their debt securities to anyone in C² t−1 who is
holding them.
6. Agents in C² t−1 trade with agents in Dt.
This structure is represented in Table 3.
Subperiods t.2 and t.5 are distinct from subperiod t.3.
In t.2 and t.5, debt is being settled at face value. In con-
trast, in t.3, debt is being purchased at market terms prior
to settlement. Here, as in the other markets where volun-
tary exchange occurs, the price must be determined en-
dogenously by agents’ optimization together with mar-
ket-clearing.
When an agent is young, the agent’s incentive to
trade with another member of the cohort is evidently af-
fected by what the agent knows or believes about both
its own subgroup and the trading partner’s subgroup in
the market structure when the two agents are old. I as-
sume that no information about these matters is available
until the second period of the agents’ lives. Later, I dis-
cuss an implication of this assumption for welfare analy-
sis.
Another question concerns the structure of debt secu-
rity issuance. Is trade bilateral, so that each young D
agent issues one debt security to a single young C agent?
Or does each young D agent make small purchases from
many young C agents, so that each C agent holds a
diversiﬁed portfolio of small-denomination debt securi-
ties afterward? Risk-diversiﬁcation considerations would
seemingly lead the C agents to prefer the latter arrange-
ment, if it is feasible.
13 The diversiﬁed, nonstrategic trad-
ing arrangement will be modeled here.
This arrangement implies an asymmetry in the inter-
pretation of the quantity of debt securities held by an
agent. If an agent holds a positive quantity of these, then
that quantity represents a diversiﬁed portfolio of securi-
ties payable by all issuers in the economy, in proportion
to those issuers’ amounts of debt outstanding. If the quan-
tity of debt is negative (that is, if the agent is an issuer of
debt), then it represents debt issued by the agent.
Here, as in the market structures studied above, equi-
librium is deﬁned in terms of agents’ optimization togeth-
er with market-clearing. The objective function of an
agent in Ct is slightly different here than above, since the
agent’s consumption can depend on whether the agent is
in C¢ t or C² t. I assume that such an agent maximizes ex-
pected utility and assign probability g to the event that the
agent is in C¢ t and consumes bundle x¢ a n d1−g to the
event that the agent is in C² t and consumes bundle x²,i n
period t+1 .
The optimization problem of an agent in C, then, is to









(25) max u(x1)+gv(x¢ 2) + (1−g)v(x² 2)subject to constraints. The constraints and market condi-
tions are conceptually straightforward, but they are nu-
merous because the environment is so complex. They are
presented in the Appendix.
The structure of trading in this environment is indi-
cated in Chart 3.
Inefficiency of Equilibrium
The market structure just described permits trading of
goods and three ﬁnancial assets: money (m), new debt
(d), and seasoned debt (d¢). It is clear that there exists a
pattern of trade—involving goods for new debt, goods
for money, and seasoned debt for money market trans-
actions, as well as settlement of seasoned debt—that
achieves the stationary efficient allocation. That pattern
of trade requires goods and assets to be exchanged in
particular ratios. If those ratios are not the same as the
price ratios in a competitive equilibrium, though, then
the stationary efficient allocation will not be a competi-
tive equilibrium allocation of the economy. Following
Freeman (1996a, b), I show that equilibrium is ineffi-
cient in an economy where g > d.
I begin the argument by supposing that, in subperiod
1 in period t − 1, each agent in Ct−1 has acquired debt
securities for one unit of money to be delivered in period
t. (It is easy to see that, except in autarky equilibrium,
the entire money stock of one unit must be passed from
cohort to cohort in a stationary equilibrium.) Note that
market-clearing in that subperiod implies that each agent
in Dt−1 owes one unit of money in period t. By diversiﬁ-
cation, in subperiod 2 in period t, each agent in Ct−1 re-
ceives a total of d units of ﬁat money from the agents in
D¢ t−1 and is still owed 1 − d from the remaining agents in
Dt−1. Agents in C¢ t−1 will not be able to collect their pay-
ments from those debtors in subperiod 4, though, so in
subperiod 3 they will sell the debt securities still in their
possession to other creditors who will participate in sub-
period 4.
Agents in C¢ t−1 regard debt as worthless except in
trade in subperiod 3. They will trade away their full in-
ventories at any positive price.
Debt is certain to be paid by subperiod 5, and agents
in C² t−1 do not need to use ﬁat money until subperiod 6,
so these agents will be willing to pay up to the face val-
ue of debt to obtain ﬁat money in subperiod 3.
Thus, all money held by agents in C² t−1, up to the face
value of the debt held by agents in D² t−1, will be ex-
changed for that debt. This determines the equilibrium
price in the secondary market.
At the beginning of subperiod 3, the aggregate amount
of money that will be provided in settlement of the debt
in the possession of agents in C¢ t−1 is g(1−d). The total
amount of money in the possession of agents in C² t−1 is
(1−g)d. Thus, the competitive price in subperiod 3 of a
debt claim for one unit of money is
(26) p
3
d¢ = min [1, (1−g)d/g(1−d)].
If d < g, then p <1 .
Thus, if d < g, then availability of money to interme-
diaries is a bottleneck in some sense. It remains to be
shown that this bottleneck causes Pareto inefficiency.
Freeman’s (1996a, b) argument continues with a compar-
ison of the amount of consumption enjoyed by an agent
in C¢ with the amount enjoyed by an agent in C² in equi-
librium. The following allocationshows that the consump-
tion of an agent in C¢ is lower, so the fact that too few
debtors have market access in subperiod 2 induces con-
sumption inequality among agents who are identical ex-
cept for market access. This inequality is risk from an ex
ante perspective, so from that perspective it is a Pareto-
inefficient allocation among risk-averse agents.
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Speciﬁcally, an agent in C¢ t−1 receives d units of mon-
ey in settlement of debt in subperiod 2 and p
3
d¢(1−d) units
of money from sale in subperiod 3 of debt not yet set-
tled. Thus, an agent in C¢ t−1 holds less than one unit of
ﬁat money to trade in subperiod 4.
In subperiod 3, an agent in C² t−1 spends all its money
received in settlement of debt in subperiod 2 to purchase
debt at price p < 1, which will be settled at par in subpe-
riod 5. Thus, the agent will hold more ﬁat money in
subperiod 6 than if the agent had not traded in the sec-
ondary market. That is, the agent will hold more than
one unit of ﬁat money to trade in subperiod 6.
In equilibrium, agents in Dt must sell their endow-
ment good for the same price in subperiod 4 as in sub-
period 6. Therefore, an agent in C² t−1 consumes more of
that good than does an agent in C¢ t−1, since the agent in
C² t−1 has more money to spend at the identical price for
goods.
Chartering a Monetary Authority
to Achieve Efficiency
Representing a Monetary Authority
Within the Model
Before I present a result from Freeman (1996a, b) re-
garding the potential role of a monetary authority in
achieving efficiency, it is worthwhile to reﬂect on what a
monetary authority is and on how it ought to be modeled
in this formal environment. First, consider what Freeman
(1996b, pp. 1129, 1134) assumes about the monetary au-
thority and how he characterizes its optimal policy:
There exists . . . a monetary authority able to issue ﬁat
money . . . . This authority issues an initial stock of . . .
[money] to each initial old creditor . . . . Suppose that the
. . . monetary authority (or “central bank”) is now autho-
rized to issue and lend ﬁat money equal to the nominal
amount of debt presented by any of the late-leaving credi-
tors . . . . This central-bank loan must be repaid with ﬁat
money upon the arrival...o ft h elate-arriving borrowers.
Because the monetary authority is described as deal-
ing with the creditors in every cohort, superﬁcially it
might seem that the authority must be an inﬁnite-lived
agent. In that case, the monetary authority would be in a
position to provide intermediation services that no pri-
vate agent could provide.
There is a convincing argument that this is an inad-
visable way to think about the role of a monetary au-
thority or, in general, an agent that carries out public pol-
icy.
15 The criticism has to do with a dilemma regarding
how to interpret the restrictions on market access in the
model economy. These restrictions could be interpreted
as reﬂecting technological restrictions, but then why the
monetary authority is not bound by the same constraints
that private agents face would be inexplicable. Alterna-
tively, the restrictions could be interpreted as reﬂecting
institutional or legal constraints from which the mone-tary authority is exempt, but then the most natural wel-
fare conclusion to draw from the inefficiency of compet-
itive equilibrium would be that those constraints on pri-
vate agents ought to be relaxed in general, not that there
is a rationale for a distinguished agent to be granted a
special exemption. These seem to be the only tenable in-
terpretations of the market-access restrictions, and nei-
ther provides a good basis for understanding the role of a
monetary authority.
On closer inspection, though, the monetary authority
does not intermediate between agents who do not meet
one another. In every period, it issues money in subpe-
riod 3, which it uses to purchase seasoned debt. Then, in
subperiod 5 in the same period, it absorbs the money it
receives in settlement of this debt. Thus, rather than speci-
fying that there is a special, inﬁnite-lived agent in the
model, one can equally well specify that, in subperiod 2
in each period t, one of the agents in C² t−1 is designated to
be the monetary authority.
How a Monetary Authority Can Achieve Efficiency
Consider what can be accomplished by such a monetary
authority, which consists of one agent in each cohort
(speciﬁcally, in C² t−1, in each period t) who is autho-
rized to behave differently in one respect, and is con-
strained to behave differently in another respect, from
the other agents. This distinguished agent is authorized
to create money in subperiod 3 and is required to de-
stroy in subperiod 5 an amount of money equal to that
created. Speciﬁcally, the agent is authorized to create
g(1−d) − (1−g)d units of money for purchase of sea-
soned debt in subperiod 2, so that (by the argument
leading to (26) in the laissez-faire case) p
3
d¢ = 1. This in-
tervention eliminates the inequality of consumption be-
tween agents in C¢ t−1 and those in C² t−1. Thus, it attains
efficiency from the ex ante perspective.
Interpreting the monetary authority in this way, as be-
ing one of the private agents in the population who is se-
lected to carry out a special responsibility, avoids mak-
ing the suspect assumption that the monetary authority
has a mysterious technological superiority over the pri-
vate agents. This interpretation also has a clear implica-
tion regarding the nature of the contract to which the
monetary authority is subject. That authority is exempt
from the prohibition that other agents face against cre-
ating money (that is, against counterfeiting). However, it
is expected to absorb the money received in settlement in
subperiod 5 (with the exception of money received in
settlement of debt in its private portfolio, as opposed to
the debt initially purchased with newly created money),
rather than to spend that money in subperiod 6 to ﬁnance
consumption for itself. For such an expectation to be ful-
ﬁlled, the monetary authority must be constrained in
some way, or its incentives must be modiﬁed in some
way, that is not represented explicitly in the model. This
implicit assumption is analogous to the implicit assump-
tion of some enforcement technology to compel repay-
ment of debt. Subject to this assumption, the present
analysis shows that the difference between a monetary
authority and an ordinary private agent is simply one of
incentives and not one of intrinsic opportunities or capa-
bilities. (The one obvious advantage that a monetary au-
thority typically enjoys with respect to private banks—a
monopoly, or at least a competitive advantage, in note
issuance—is an artifact of government policy rather than
being intrinsic.)
Nothing in the formal model requires that this special
incentive arrangement be offered only to a single agent.
It could be supposed instead that all agents in C² t−1
would be subject to the arrangement. However, the im-
plicitly assumed monitoring and enforcement functions
are presumably costly to carry out. It would be ineffi-
cient to exercise them over all agents in C² t−1, or even
over several of them, if one agent can make all the trans-
actions required for efficiency. This consideration sug-
gests that the activity of central banking is probably a
natural monopoly.
Relationship to Central Bank Independence
This agent-within-the-model interpretation of the nature
of a monetary authority is different from the social-plan-
ner interpretation that economists often make. Neverthe-
less, the agent-within-the-model interpretation is conso-
nant with the views expressed by distinguished scholars
of central banking, such as Sayers (1967), Cairncross
(1988), Goodhart (1988), and Cukierman (1995). Nu-
merous central banks, including the Bank of England,
were initially chartered as private joint-stock companies
and continued to operate under that form of ownership
long after their public policy roles were ﬁrmly estab-
lished. In many countries today, including the United
States, payment-system activities of the central bank con-
tinue to be conducted under a corporate charter, and the
government is at most a minority owner. Thus, it is very
appropriate to model the monetary authority as being
identical to a private agent in most respects.
However, despite their corporate form, central banks
are organized in a way that induces a markedly different
outcome from the operation of an ordinary corporation.
Ownership of a central bank is typically an entitlement to
a ﬁxed income stream (analogous to ownership of pre-
ferred stock, rather than common stock), with residual
proﬁts actually accruing to the government. From a per-
spective such as that taken by Jensen and Meckling
(1976), the government is the true owner of the central
bank (as the residual claimant of its proﬁt stream), and
thus control of it by the nominal owners is really a means
of separating ownership and control in economic terms.
To the extent that the nominal owners of the central
bank have the primary inﬂuence on the appointment and
retention of its governor and other senior executives, it is
foreseeable that the executives will have relatively small
incentive to maximize proﬁt. Other charter provisions,
such as restrictions on the types of asset that can be held
in the portfolio, complement the ownership structure by
constraining the central bank from emulating the deci-
sions that private agents would make to maximize proﬁts.
The fact that central bank charters have such striking
and idiosyncratic provisions, which are recognized to
safeguard central bank independence from the residual
claimant of the bank’s proﬁt, constitutes evidence in fa-
vor of the modeling approach taken here: to represent a
monetary authority as an agent with the same intrinsic
opportunities and capabilities as other agents, but with
different induced incentives or legal constraints. Con-
versely, if the market structure speciﬁed above, which
requires intermediaries to settle transactions, is the one
that would exist under laissez-faire, then the fact that anefficient allocation can be achieved by a departure from
proﬁt maximization on the part of the monetary authority
provides a normative argument in favor of central bank
independence.
Institutional and Contractual Alternatives
to Central Bank Participation
A careful statement of the conclusion reached above is
that, if the market structure requiring intermediaries were
in effect and there were no participation by a monetary
authority, then central bank participation in the form of
open market operations, or equivalent intervention to
support the secondary-market price of debt in subperiod
3, would support an efficient allocation that Pareto-domi-
nates the laissez-faire equilibrium allocation from an ex
ante perspective.
The applicability of this analysis to actual markets is
an open question, because it is not certain that the market
structure requiring intermediaries to settle transactions is
the one that would emerge under laissez-faire. That mar-
ket structure abstracts from private-sector agents that pro-
vide payment services, such as escrow agents and clear-
inghouses. It also abstracts from contractual features of
payment, such as contract netting and novation.
In this section, I discuss one such private-sector
arrangement that can achieve efficiency in the intermedi-
aries environment. This arrangement resembles an inter-
mediary that uses novation and substitution (that is, sub-
stitution of debt payable by itself for debt payable by the
original issuer) to settle contracts. Although there are var-
ious types of intermediary in an actual economy that re-
semble this theoretical arrangement in some respects, the
parallel with clearinghouses seems especially strong.
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A Market Structure With Novation Securities
An alternative to having a monetary authority is for
agents in C² t−1 to issue debt securities—called novation
securities—in subperiod t.3 in return for the debt secu-
rities of traders in C¢ t−1 that have not yet been settled.
The agents in C¢ t−1 will exchange these novation securi-
ties for good 1 in subperiod t.4. The novation securities
will be paid in subperiod t.6, when the agents in Dt who
have acquired them will meet the agents in C² t−1 who
issued them. In equilibrium, both the initial securities
and the novation securities will trade at face value. Thus,
again, the risk induced by trading-opportunity uncertain-
ty will be fully insured, and efficiency will be achieved.
The asset structure of this economy is described by
adding novation debt (denoted n) to the trading structure
described in Table 4.
The budget constraints and market-clearing conditions
for this market structure are straightforward modiﬁca-
tions of those for the market structure that requires inter-
mediaries to settle transactions.
With respect to the characteristics of securities that
are represented explicitly in this model, there is hardly
any difference between this novation security and the
money issued and reabsorbed by the central bank above.
Both money and the novation security are issued by
agents in C² t−1 in subperiod t.3 to agents in C¢ t−1 in return
for the debt held by those agents. The agents in C¢ t−1
trade the newly issued security (money or the novation
security, depending on the payment arrangement) in sub-
period t.4 to agents in Dt for those agents’ consumption
good. The security, or another security of the same type,
is thereafter removed from circulation by the issuer. In
the case of money, this happens in subperiod t.5 when
the seasoned debt that was purchased with newly issued
money is settled. In the case of novation debt, the money
received in settlement of seasoned debt in subperiod t.5
is used to settle the novation debt in subperiod t.6. Only
with respect to the speciﬁcs of how removal from circu-
lation is accomplished does novation debt differ from
money in more than name.
Implicitly, though, money and novation securities dif-
fer in much more than name. What differs between the
two asset structures is the institutional framework of
ownership, monitoring, and enforcement that must exist
to support them. In contrast to the distinctive features of a
central bank that have been mentioned above, a clear-
inghouse that operates by novation and substitution is
subject to roughly the same framework of contract and
enforcement as is a private debtor. Although it would be
an exaggeration to claim that a central bank is totally
unlike a clearinghouse (especially since a clearinghouse
is typically chartered as a nonproﬁt corporation, is jointly
owned by a group of the banks that it serves, and has
restricted powers that prevent it from competing directly
with them), in practice the distinction between them is
substantial and easy to recognize.
Historically, clearinghouses preceded central banks in
most industrialized countries, and central banks were
chartered in part to address perceived inefficiencies in
the payment systems where those clearinghouses were
already operating. Despite the presence of central banks,
which have tended to be advantaged relative to clearing-
houses in point of their legal powers, clearinghouses
continue to exist and to play a major role. These facts
suggest that probably neither institutional form has an
absolute advantage over the other. The basic model of
intermediated debt and its extension in this section can
perhaps provide a basis for thinking systematically about
the relative advantages of each type of institution in vari-
ous circumstances.
An Economic Deﬁnition
of Novation and Substitution
A noteworthy feature of the extended model just dis-
cussed is that it permits an economic deﬁnition of nova-
tion and substitution. This operating procedure of a
clearinghouse is typically described in institutional terms
related to contract law, as in the following quotation
from a report of a committee of the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements (the Angell Report 1989, ¶2.5):
One type of arrangement would establish a clearing house
that would be substituted as the central counterparty in
deals submitted for netting by participants in the arrange-
ment, in order to effect a binding multilateral netting
among those participants (“multilateral netting by novation
and substitution”).
Such substitution is exactly what takes place, in the
equilibrium of the asset structure discussed above, when
agents in C¢ t−1 swap debt issued by agents in Dt−1 for
novation securities (also debt) issued by agents in C² t−1.
Each agent in Ct−1 has a different portfolio of speciﬁc
debt securities after this swap than before. However, each
of these agents has the same net credit position afterwardas before. Agents in C¢ t−1 hold debt securities both before
and after the swap, and in equilibrium, the face value of
the securities (as well as the market value) is the same.
Agents in C² t−1 change from being only holders of debt
before the swap to being both holders and issuers after-
ward, but again, there is no change in their net credit
position. Thus, it is clear that novation and substitution
can be deﬁned in economic terms as an issuance and ex-
change of debt that leaves the net credit position of all
agents unaffected.
The economic role of novation and substitution is to
transfer debt from agents who do not have an opportunity
to receive settlement of it to other agents who do have
that opportunity, without affecting anyone’s wealth posi-
tion and in such a way that the initial debt holders have
trading opportunities (that is, liquidity) equivalent to what
they would have had if their initial debt holdings had
been settled rather than traded.
Failure of a Clearinghouse to Settle
There is a consensus among payment-system experts that
the failure of a clearinghouse to settle its obligations cre-
ated by novation and substitution is an especially wor-
risome systemic risk. This view is clearly expressed by
the Angell Report (1989, ¶6.27.iv):
Multilateral netting by novation and substitution has the
potential to reduce liquidity risks more than any other in-
stitutional form, but this depends critically on the ﬁnancial
condition of any central counterparty to the netting; if the
liquidity of a central counterparty is weak, the liquidity
risks of this institutional form may be greater than in the
case of bilateral netting by novation; the credit risks of this
institutional form are generally less than in other forms that
have been considered, subject again to the identity and con-
dition of any central counterparty.
Although Freeman (1996a, b) does not make such a
claim, one tempting way to interpret his result is that
the inability of agents in C² to settle novation securities
makes the involvement of a monetary authority indis-
pensable in attaining efficiency in his model economy.
Such an interpretation would be mistaken for two rea-
sons.
Before I discuss these reasons, let me mention that
Freeman’s model has a feature that I have omitted from
the efficient monetary authority version developed above.
Freeman posits that, before the beginning of subperiod
t.6, the agents in Ct−1 and in Dt are exogenously and ran-
domly dispersed among several “islands.” (This seques-
tration lasts only for the duration of the subperiod, so the
debtor agents are able to trade in period t + 1 exactly as
speciﬁed in the model with a monetary authority or with
novation securities, if they are traded.) If agent aÎDt
has accepted a novation security issued by agent a² Î
C² t−1, a is on island i in subperiod t.6, and a² is on island
i ²¹iin subperiod t.6, then a² cannot settle the novation
security that a holds.
Despite this inability of prospective intermediaries in
Freeman’s (1996a, b) model economy to settle all (or
even most) of the novation securities that they issue, the
market structure involving those securities will still be
efficient. To see this, suppose that there are I distinct is-
lands. If the face value of novation securities issued by
an agent in a² Î C² t−1 is f, and if those securities are
traded to agents in Dt who are dispersed equally among
the islands, then only a subset of the securities having
value f/I can be settled. In sharp contrast, agent a² will
receive settlement on all the seasoned debt d¢ for which
the agent trades novation securities that it issues. Conse-
quently, agents in C² t−1 will bid the novation security




n)u pt oI, rather than
only up to par. Subsequently, in subperiod t.4, agents in
Dt will recognize that only 1/I of the novation debt will
be settled; so as a result of their optimization, the money
price p
4
n of a unit of the novation security (speciﬁed to be
settled in subperiod t.6 for one unit of money) in that
subperiod will be only 1/I. Thus, the amount of good 2
that an agent in C¢ t−1 can obtain by exchanging a unit of
seasoned debt for novation securities and then exchang-






2, which is the
same amount that the agent could obtain in the model
economy with novation securities. That is, equilibrium in
a version of that model economy with islands would still
be efficient, because agents with rational expectations
would fully adjust in market equilibrium for the occur-
rence of settlement failure on the part of intermediaries.
The efficiency of this equilibrium is one reason it
would be a mistake to suppose that participation of a
monetary authority is necessary to attain efficiency in
Freeman’s (1996a, b) model. Of course, the argument in
the preceding paragraph makes it clear that the interme-
diary’s inability to settle in the model economy differs
radically in its foreseeability from the type of settlement
failure on the part of an actual intermediary that con-
cerns policymakers so much. This is not to say that pol-
icymakers’ concerns are necessarily warranted, but rather
that models of settlement do not yet reﬂect some of the
features of the actual economy that are crucial to reason-
ing conclusively about those concerns.
The other reason it would be a mistake to interpret
Freeman’s (1996a, b) model as justifying a necessary role
for a monetary authority is directly related to the con-
siderations discussed above regarding the constraints fac-
ing a central bank and their relationship to the constraints
that face a clearinghouse. The import of my arguments is
that a central bank cannot be regarded as an intrinsically
better type of institution than a clearinghouse. Certainly,
given the potential for the payment system to be abused
for political ends, few people would be enthusiastic about
transferring the main settlement responsibilities from a
smoothly functioning clearinghouse to a central bank that
lacked independence. However, as policymakers recog-
nize, if the structure of a clearinghouse raises prudential
concerns, one needs to examine whether the structure can
be strengthened before concluding that the only solution
is for the central bank to take over the clearinghouse’s
function.
Conclusion
This study has been concerned with the welfare analysis
of central bank and clearinghouse intervention in pay-
ment arrangements. At a formal level, this analysis is
done by extending a model of the use of intermediated
debt for payment, so that private-sector intermediaries
can issue debt that corresponds to the clearinghouse
practice of novation and substitution. If such debt can
be issued, then the resulting market equilibrium under
laissez-faire is efficient, so there is no need for direct
participation by a monetary authority. This result caneven hold in the extended version of a model environ-
ment (which is seen to be very special, however) where
intermediaries are unable to settle some of the debt they
issue.
Although issues of institutional governance lie be-
yond the scope of the formal model, the analysis makes
it clear that they are inseparable from the market equi-
librium issues that are treated explicitly. Whether or not
efficiency might require a central bank to participate in
the payment system depends on the degree to which a
central bank can promise reliably and credibly to reab-
sorb money that it issues to facilitate payments and also
on whether the commercial law framework governing
the operation of a private-sector payment intermediary is
sufficient to warrant agents’ use of debt issued by the in-
termediary as a money-like medium of exchange.
The credibility of a central bank’s promise about re-
absorption evidently depends, in turn, on its governance
structure. It is likely that the institutions of central bank
governance necessary for credible participation in the
payment system are essentially identical to those neces-
sary for effective conduct of monetary policy in a nar-
row sense. Thus, to whatever extent there is a need for a
central bank to participate directly in the payment sys-
tem, this need reinforces the considerations in favor of
chartering a politically independent central bank. More-
over, the need for political independence suggests that
the central bank would typically be a more appropriate
public-sector participant in the payment system than
would the treasury or another agency under the immedi-
ate control of the government.
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1Throughout this study, the term money refers to outside money.
2Although I do not explicitly consider risk of the payor’s inability to settle in this
study, Freeman (1996a, b) does consider it. He ﬁnds that the beneﬁt of using inter-
mediated debt is robust to the existence of some level of settlement risk.
3An issue that is related, although beyond the scope of this study, concerns the
scope of private-sector participation. By their regulatory policies, some governments
are encouraging nonbank ﬁrms to enter the payment industry, while others are in-
clined to erect legal barriers to such entry.
4It is sometimes suggested that the central bank can enhance payment-system
efficiency due to its ability to guarantee immediate and ﬁnal payment, which a pri-
vate-sector intermediary cannot do. This suggestion seems to reﬂect the view that a
private intermediary would face potential liquidity crises analogous to bank runs,
which the central bank would not face because of its ability to issue new ﬁat money.
However, if a central bank is empowered to serve as a lender of last resort to a pri-
vate payment-system intermediary, then this observation is not sufficient to establish
that it must also participate in the payment system on a day-to-day basis, any more
than the possibility of bank runs establishes that the central bank must conduct day-
to-day business as a commercial bank.
5As a model of a central bank, Freeman’s (1996b) model is clearly a partial-
equilibrium model. An overall judgment about whether a central bank should partici-
pate in the payment system should take into account the opportunity cost of such
participation with respect to the bank’s other objectives. However, if the participation
of the monetary authority can enhance the economic efficiency of the payment sys-
tem, then there is at least a prima facie case for that participation.
6Freeman (1996a) posits an artiﬁcial agent, which must be endowed with a spe-
cial capability (an inﬁnite lifetime, in an environment where ordinary agents have
two-period lives) to serve as the intermediary. In the model that I present here, or-
dinary agents are able to undertake the task of intermediation.
7The process of novation and substitution involves a contract between a pair of
clearinghouse members A and B being replaced by two contracts: one between A and
the clearinghouse and the other between the clearinghouse and B. In each contract,
the clearinghouse is obligated to make the same net trade as was the party that it re-
places.
8This secondary-market transaction can be structured in various ways. The debt
can be in the form of a security payable to the bearer, or the debt can be assignable,
or novation can occur.
9This access is called market participation elsewhere, but I have already used
participation in a different sense in the introduction. In a formal sense, of course, the
fact that each agent has access to markets in only two periods is already a constraint.
The constraints to be introduced here will impede trade within an age cohort.
10That is, the deﬁnition of equilibrium is in the spirit of Radner (1972). A fully
adequate equilibrium concept for this environment would allow for the endogenous
introduction of securities, as do Allen and Gale (1988). Instead, for each market, I
specify an exogenous set of securities to be traded. In principle, this is a shortcoming,
but—particularly since the equilibria to be studied here support efficient stationary
allocations—apparently there would be no scope for the introduction of further secu-
rities. That is, I believe that these equilibria would continue to be equilibria if a ro-
bustness-to-innovation requirement were explicitly imposed.
11The only equilibrium in which the price of money is zero is autarky.
12Alternatively, it could be speciﬁed that all agents in Ct−1 trade with agents in Dt
in this subperiod. In equilibrium, every agent in C² t−1 would make a zero net trade in
this market.
13Moreover, if a bilateral arrangement is what one intends to have emerge as an
equilibrium trading pattern, there must be some constraint on (or cost of) debt secu-
rity issuance to induce it. In that case, the terms of trade would be negotiated by
bargaining within each two-member trading coalition, rather than taken by agents as
parametrically determined by an economywide price.
14The speciﬁcation that all agents in C are identical ex ante is inessential to pro-
ducing consumption inequality, although it simpliﬁes the calculation of equilibrium
by making all young creditors’ decisions identical. Its signiﬁcance is to make an
allocation with consumption inequality, which would be Pareto incomparable to the
equal-consumption allocation if agents were distinguishable ex ante, into a Pareto-
inefficient allocation.
15A very clear development of this argument is by Wallace (1988), in a discus-
sion of an analogous issue regarding the Diamond-Dybvig model of intermediation.
16The pricing below par of debt in subperiod t.3 seems to reﬂect one aspect of
what occurred during bank panics under the U.S. National Banking System in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries. The novation securities introduced below bear strik-
ing resemblance to the clearinghouse loan certiﬁcates that were issued during those
episodes in the absence of a central bank. Those certiﬁcates and the central banking




Here I describe the constraints and market conditions facing
agents in the ﬁrst main market structure studied in the preced-
ing paper: the model with separation within cohorts and a need
for intermediated debt securities.










(A1) max u(x1)+gv(x¢ 2) + (1−g)v(x² 2)
subject to
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Between Types of Agents in the Basic Structure . . .
When All Agents in Each Cohort Have Access to the Market
(Thin lines indicate life span; thicker lines indicate market access.)
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t.2 C , D 1, 2, m
C = creditor, D = debtor















Table 1 Chart 1 Trade Structure. . . With Reversed Transaction Order . . .
t.1 C , D 1, 2, d
t.2 C   , D d, m
t.3 C   , D 2, m
t–1






When All Agents in Each Cohort Have Access to the Market
(Thin lines indicate life span; thicker lines indicate market access.)
C = creditor, D = debtor
1, 2 = goods, m = money















Time (t ). . . With Separation Within Cohorts . . .
t.1 C , D 1, 2, d
t.2 C   , D9 d9 , m
t.3 C    d9 , m
t.4 C9 , D 2, m
t.5 C0 , D0 d9 , m
t.6 C0 , D 2, m
t–1






When All Agents in Each Cohort Have Access to the Market
(Thin lines indicate life span; thicker lines indicate market access.)
C = creditor, D = debtor
1, 2 = goods, m = money









































4. . . And With Novation Debt
Table 4 Trade
C = creditor, D = debtor
1, 2 = goods, m = money
d = debt security, n = novation debt
t.1 C , D 1, 2, d
t.2 C   , D9 d9 , m
t.3 C    d9 , n, m
t.4 C9 , D 2, n, m
t.5 C0 , D0 d9 , m
t.6 C0 , D 2, n, m
t–1
Subperiod
Who Has
Access
What Is
Traded
t t
t–1
t–1
t t–1
t–1
t–1
t–1
t